
Equality talk
The essay starts from the Declaration of Independence’s claim that all men are created equal. It asks why “equality” now divides people when it once seemed to offer common ground. Bejan argues that the word looks precise because it borrows from mathematics and geometry, but that this precision is misleading. In practice, talk of equality slides between sameness, fairness and standing as peers. The modern argument over equity versus equality is muddled in the same way.
She then shows that older meanings of “equal” were quite different from ours. In early modern English it often meant evenness or balance. Aristotle separated arithmetic equality, which gives everyone identical shares, from geometric equality, which gives shares in proportion to merit. Roman jurists and early Christian writers used “equal” to mean being subject to the same law or judgment. That did not make people social peers.
The turning point, in her account, comes in the summer of 1646. The Leveller John Lilburne refused to kneel or remove his hat before the House of Lords. He insisted that God had made everyone equal and alike. Lilburne and the Levellers who followed him exploited the gap between being judged by a common standard and being someone’s peer. Jury service gave that move a practical model. Jurors sit as peers even though they differ in many other ways. Women and enslaved Africans were largely shut out of that practice.
Bejan concludes that equality should not be dropped because it is ambiguous, since that ambiguity gave the idea its power. What equality means depends on social practices such as the jury, not on sharper definitions. It is something people do, and something that has to be done again each day. She ends by saying that it rests on people’s dealings with one another, not on the laws of nature.

